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Abstract
Besley	and	Coate	(1995)	analyse	the	impact	of	joint	liability	and	social	
sanctions	on	repayment	rates	when	repayment	enforcement	is	imper-
fect.	Motivated	by	the	microfinance	industry’s	move	towards	markets,	
we	 conduct	 an	 equilibrium	 analysis	 of	 the	 Besley–Coate	model.	We	
find	that	 individual	 loan	contracts	may	be	used	in	market	equilibrium,	
even	though	group	 lending	entails	 the	higher	repayment	rate	and	the	
lower	break-even	 interest	 rate.	This	 is	 because	 group	 lending	 causes	
potentially	large	deadweight	losses.	The	market	equilibrium	is	possibly	
characterised	by	 financial	 fragility,	 redlining	or	rationing.	Cooperation	
between	borrowers	and	social	sanctions	imposed	on	each	other	in	the	
case	of	strategic	default	turn	group	lending	into	the	equilibrium	mode	of	
finance	and	ameliorate	the	market	failures.
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Introduction
Two stylised facts of the microfinance industry are that (a) ‘microfi-
nance meets the market’ (Cull et al. 2009) and that (b) group lending 
(GL) arrangements regularly incorporate enforcement mechanisms 
beyond joint liability including mechanisms that rely on social capital.
(a) Microfinance institutions (MFIs) increasingly rely on markets 
to fund loans. In Cull et al.’s (2009: 174) sample of 346 MFIs with 
combined assets of $25 billion (which is somewhat skewed toward for-
profits) for-profit institutions (banks, credit unions and rural banks) 
account for 60 per cent of the assets, NGOs for 21 per cent and the 
non-bank financial institutions, which include both for-profits and non-
profits, for 19 per cent. According to Reille and Forster (2008: 1), ‘[t]he 
entry of private investors is the most notable change in the microfinance 
investment marketplace’. There is a broad consensus that the huge 
demand for microcredit will continue to attract financial institutions with 
commercial interests: ‘[m]icrofinance will no doubt continue to expand 
and become part of the financial mainstream’ (Cull et al. 2009: 189). 
This trend towards market funding poses a challenge to microfinance 
theory, calling for equilibrium models of the markets for microcredit and 
loanable funds.
(b) While early studies of GL emphasised the incentive effects of 
joint liability per se, it has become increasingly clear that other aspects 
of the lender–borrower relation are essential in making joint liability 
operative and in fostering high repayment rates (i.e., repayment proba-
bilities) through other channels (see, e.g., Morduch 1999, Section 3, and 
Armendáriz de Aghion and Morduch 2000, Section 5). Some mecha-
nisms are operative both with individual lending (IL) and with GL: con-
tingent renewal provides incentives to invest in one’s reputation as a 
reliable borrower, and frequent repayments help substitute income for 
wealth as collateral. The mechanisms specific to GL ‘all rely on social 
 at Universitatsbibliothek on August 26, 2016emf.sagepub.comDownloaded from 
Viability of Group Lending	 61
Journal of Emerging Market Finance, 12, 1 (2013): 59–106
connections’ (Karlan 2007: F52). They include peer monitoring and 
cross reporting, which help overcome information asymmetries when 
borrowers are better informed about each other than lenders are. 
Moreover, social connections between group members provide incen-
tives to invest in one’s reputation as a reliable business partner in trade 
transactions and allow the exertion of direct social pressure to repay, in 
particular when otherwise group members become liable for one’s 
obligations.
The present article performs an equilibrium analysis of one of the 
seminal models in the theory of microfinance, viz., Besley and Coate’s 
(1995) (henceforth: ‘BC’) GL model. BC investigate the impact of joint 
liability and social sanctions in borrower groups on loan repayment 
rates. Project returns are sufficient to repay in their model, but due to 
enforcement problems, borrowers do not repay unless the penalty for 
default weighs heavier than the burden of repayment. Compared with IL, 
GL has two effects on repayment rates then. For one thing, it enhances 
repayment when one borrower is able and willing to stand in for a mem-
ber of a group who does not repay. For another, however, liability for the 
repayment of the other members of her group potentially discourages a 
borrower from repaying at all when she would have repaid an individual 
loan. BC show that, in the absence of social sanctions, when pay-offs are 
independently and uniformly distributed and penalties for default are 
proportional to pay-offs, (depending on model parameters) either GL 
leads to a lower repayment rate than IL for all interest rates or the repay-
ment rate is higher with GL than with IL only at low interest rates. By 
contrast, GL dominates IL in terms of repayment rates if there are suffi-
ciently severe social sanctions. These results have been highly influen-
tial in shaping the view that joint liability in groups succeeds in achieving 
high repayment rates only in conjunction with other enforcement 
mechanisms.
BC emphasise that their results ‘should not be taken as implying that 
group lending is better or worse than individual lending in any broader 
sense than repayment rates’ (p. 16), so ‘a more comprehensive analysis 
of the differences between the two lending schemes is an interesting sub-
ject for further research’ (p. 16). This is the aim of the present article: in 
line with stylised fact (a), we supplement the BC model with a minimum 
set of additional assumptions that enables us to characterise market equi-
libria. We determine the equilibrium lending type (IL or GL), which 
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maximises borrower utility, that is, minimises deadweight losses, subject 
to the break-even constraint for MFIs. In line with stylised fact (b), we 
take account of two kinds of social capital which help enforce repay-
ments in groups, viz., cooperative behaviour in the repayment game 
(as in Ahlin and Townsend 2007, Subsection 1.3.2)1 and social sanctions 
(as in BC, Section 4).
We show that there is even less scope for GL as the equilibrium mode 
of finance in the model with non-cooperative behaviour and without 
social sanctions than BC’s comparison of repayment rates suggests: for a 
broad range of model parameters, IL is used in equilibrium, even though 
GL achieves a higher repayment rate and breaks even at a lower interest 
rate. This is a straightforward consequence of the basic model mechanisms: 
With IL, default occurs if, and only if, the return on investment is so low 
that it does not pay to repay a single loan. By contrast, with GL default 
potentially occurs when a borrower is willing to repay one loan but not 
two loans (viz., if, in addition, the other group member is not willing to 
repay a single loan). Hence, for a given interest rate, default occurs at 
higher project returns with GL and, given that penalties are proportional 
to project returns, causes larger penalties (i.e., deadweight losses) if it 
occurs. As a consequence, whenever the break-even interest rates with IL 
and GL are not too dissimilar, the equilibrium type of finance is IL. 
Moreover, we show that the market equilibrium potentially displays the 
sorts of allocation failure familiar from the literature on asymmetric 
information in credit markets, viz., financial fragility, redlining or credit 
rationing. Cooperative behaviour and social sanctions not only enhance 
repayment rates (compared with the non-cooperative case without 
sanctions) but also turn GL into the equilibrium mode of finance and 
ameliorate the equilibrium allocation failures.2
The BC model is the ‘best known paper’ on enforcement in GL 
(Cassar et al. 2007: F86). It is one of the four models Ahlin and Townsend 
(2007) subject to their repayment rate-based test of models of joint 
liability lending (see also Armendáriz de Aghion and Morduch 2005: 
297–298; Ghatak and Guinnane 1999: 209; Giné and Karlan 2008: 7; 
Karlan 2007: F58). The popularity of the model in microfinance theory, 
jointly with stylised fact (a), provides a sound motivation for a 
reconsideration of the model with a focus on market equilibria. The most 
closely related papers are Rai and Sjöström (2004, 2010) and Bhole and 
Ogden (2010), which analyse repayment incentives in microcredit 
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markets with asymmetric information. A big advantage of these models 
is that, as they follow the mechanism design approach, any potential 
inefficiencies cannot be attributed to the use of non-optimal contracts. 
Viewed from this perspective (see also Townsend 2003), an important 
caveat with regard to our results is that borrowers’ full liability for their 
peer group member’s repayment in conjunction with penalties which 
are proportional to pay-offs is evidently non-optimal in the BC model if 
one assumes that the penalties for default can be chosen freely: the threat 
of sufficiently severe penalties which will not be implemented in 
equilibrium ensures contractual repayment in all states of nature. 
However, given that the BC model is concerned with imperfect 
enforcement of financial claims, the penalty function should be regarded 
as a measure of the (exogenous) limitations to enforcement. Moreover, 
in view of the fact that the underlying problem is to make credit available 
to the poor, the advice to use harsh punishments to ensure repayment 
seems to be of limited practical significance.
There is some empirical evidence that is supportive of the model and 
its basic mechanisms. First, the performance of different lending types in 
the BC model depends on how well they cope with the problem of lim-
ited enforcement of financial claims. That such enforcement problems 
are prevalent in countries where microfinance is used extensively is a 
well-documented fact. For instance, in Ahlin et al.’s (2011) sample of 
373 MFIs from 74 countries, the mean time required to enforce a 
contract (taken from the World Bank’s Doing Business database) is 
645 calendar days. Second, the model predicts that social capital 
enhances repayments by fostering cooperative behaviour and making 
borrowers sensitive to social sanctions. Several variables have been 
proposed to proxy for the strength of social ties (i.e., associational social 
capital), for instance, geographical proximity and cultural homogeneity. 
Wydick (1999) and Karlan (2007), among others, confirm that the 
average distance between group members negatively affects repayment. 
Karlan (2007) also finds a positive role for cultural similarity, using a 
self-constructed cultural score. These findings have been corroborated 
by experimental evidence. For instance, in an experiment conducted in 
South Africa and Armenia, Cassar et al. (2007) find a strong positive 
impact of cultural homogeneity between group members on repayment 
performance. In Cassar et al. (2007) and Cassar and Wydick (2010), 
another variable that emerges as an important determinant of repayment 
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rates from experiments with non-enforceable repayments is personal 
trust (measured by an index constructed from responses to questions 
from the General Social Survey, whether others in society are trust-
worthy, fair and helpful). Cassar and Wydick (2010: 728) find that trust 
raises repayment rates and argue that this is because ‘[G]eneral trust is 
important to cooperative play’. This is in line with our result that coop-
eration between group members improves the performance of GL.3 
Third, there is evidence of the exertion of non-pecuniary social sanctions 
(i.e., behavioural social capital). In Karlan’s (2007) study, dropping out 
of a group with rather than without default makes it 3–6 times as likely 
that current members report a worsening of friendship, trust and willing-
ness to engage in future sales or purchase transactions. Carpenter and 
Williams (2010) conduct an experiment among micro borrowers in 
Paraguay. They find that individuals incur costs of monitoring and send-
ing negative messages in the experiment and that observed repayment 
problems are less severe in groups whose members are more ‘nosy’ in 
the experiment. A further noteworthy fact is reported by Bratton (1986) 
in his descriptive analysis of repayments on group loans and individual 
loans in credit schemes in Zimbabwe in the early 1980s: The repayment 
rate was substantially higher with GL than with IL in good times, but 
worse after the disastrous drought of 1982–1983. This is consistent 
with the BC model, in which the disadvantage of GL stems from the 
fact that GL discourages a borrower from repaying anything when she 
would have repaid a single loan. Finally, Ahlin and Townsend’s (2007: 
F42) comparative analysis of different models of GL using the Thai 
BAAC provides partially favourable results for the BC model: ‘the 
Besley and Coate model of social sanctions that prevent strategic default 
performs remarkably well, especially in the low-infrastructure northeast 
region’. The piece of evidence that is most detrimental to the BC model 
stems from Giné and Karlan’s (2008) study of the Green Bank in the 
Philippines, where the conversion of half of their GL centres in Leyte 
(randomly selected) to IL had no effect on repayment rates.4 An objec-
tion to this result is that studies based on data from different locations 
(e.g., Ahlin and Townsend 2007; Cassar and Wydick 2010) show that 
effects on repayment are not uniform across locations and contexts, so 
that it remains to be seen whether the type of liability turns out to be 
inessential in other places as well.
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The article is organised as follows. The second section describes the 
model. In the third section, we recapitulate BC’s main results. The fourth 
section characterises the model equilibrium. The fifth section introduces 
cooperative behaviour and social sanctions. The last section concludes. 
Details of the algebra are delegated to Appendices 1 and 2.
Model
This section describes the model. We focus on the model with 
independently and uniformly distributed pay-offs, with proportional, 
non-pecuniary penalties for default, and, for now, with non-cooperative 
behaviour in the repayment game and without social sanctions. Since 
the BC model is well known, the exposition is kept brief. The additional 
assumptions made in our equilibrium analysis are highlighted as 
Assumptions 1–3.
Risk-neutral borrowers without internal funds and without collateral 
are endowed with one project each. The project requires an input of one 
unit of capital. The pay-offs θ are independently and uniformly distrib-
uted on the interval [ , ]θ θ , where
         
0.
2
> >
θ θ  (1)
The cumulative distribution function is denoted by ( ) ( ( )/F θ θ θ= −
( ) for )θ θ θ θ θ− ≤ ≤ . MFIs offer loans. At the time a loan is made, the 
pay-off θ is uncertain. Once realised, the project return θ is observable 
by both borrowers and MFIs. An IL contract entails a repayment r. GL 
consists of a loan of size 2 to a group of two borrowers and repayment 
2r. When the repayment decision is made, borrowers are endowed with 
sufficiently high income (exceeding 2r) so that they are able to repay. 
However, the enforcement of repayment is imperfect, so borrowers 
choose between repaying (completely) or not (at all). The penalty for 
default is p(θ) = θ/β, where
        
5max {1, }.β θ>  (2)
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The penalty function p(θ) can be regarded as a measure of the limitations 
on the enforcement of repayments.
There is a tension between the implicit assumptions that borrowers 
have a second source of income besides project returns that enables them 
to repay but does not affect the severity of the penalty. A sensible inter-
pretation, given that this is a theory of availability of credit to the poor, 
is that a borrower could mobilise enough money to repay by selling her 
belongings, but the MFI does not expect her to do this even in the case of 
strategic default and so does not condition the penalty on the value of her 
belongings. This also explains why the borrower’s belongings are not 
used as collateral in the first place.6 As explained in the Introduction, the 
assumptions that a borrower is fully liable for the group loan if her peer 
group member decides not to contribute to the repayment and that the 
penalty is an increasing function of the project pay-off are crucial to the 
results. A brief discussion of optimal penalty schemes is in ‘Equilibrium’ 
section and in Appendix 2.
BC assume that the penalty consists of ‘two components’, ‘a mone-
tary loss due to seizure of income or assets’ and ‘a non-pecuniary cost 
resulting from being “hassled” by the bank, from loss of reputation, and 
so forth’ (p. 4). Their focus on repayment rates makes an assumption as 
to the relative magnitudes of the two components dispensable. In the 
working paper version of this article, we assume that each of the two 
components is a constant proportion of the penalty. Here, for simplicity, 
we make the following assumption (as in Rai and Sjöström 2004: 220):
	 Assumption	1: The penalty p(θ) is non-pecuniary; it is a deadweight 
loss.7
 The two borrowers in a group (i = 1, 2, say) play a non-cooperative 
two-stage repayment game. At stage 1, the strategies are: contribute 
r to the joint repayment 2r or not. If both choose to contribute, the 
pay-offs are q
i
 – r, where q
i
 is i’s realisation of q (i = 1, 2). If both 
choose not to contribute, the pay-offs are q
i
 – p(q
i
) (i = 1, 2). If 
borrower i chooses to contribute and j (≠ i) does not, i decides, at stage 
2, whether she repays 2r alone or not. If she repays, she gets q
i
 – 2r 
and j gets q
j
. If not, the pay-offs are q
i
 – p(q
i
) (i = 1, 2).
  To close the model from the supply side in the simplest possible 
fashion, we assume that the investors’ supply of funds to the MFIs is 
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perfectly elastic. That is, the MFIs’ cost of capital is exogenously 
given.
	 Assumption	2: The MFIs can raise any amount of capital at the con-
stant cost of capital r (≥1). 
 An alternative interpretation is that we consider a lending scheme run 
by a non-profit development finance institution that can do with an 
average repayment r that falls short of the market return. It is straight-
forward to consider imperfectly elastic capital supply instead, and we 
will briefly come back to this issue in our discussion of credit 
rationing.
  Due to perfect competition between MFIs, the equilibrium con-
tract maximises expected borrower utility:
	 Assumption	3: The MFIs offer the (IL or GL) contract that maxim-
ises borrowers’ expected utility subject to the constraint that they 
break even. 
 This is also a natural objective for an MFI funded by a development 
finance institution.
Repayment Rates
In this section, we briefly recapitulate BC’s comparison of repayment 
rates with IL and GL in the absence of social sanctions.
With IL, borrower i defaults if, and only if, p(q
i
) = q
i
/b < r, that is, 
q
i
 < br. So the repayment rate (the probability of repayment) is
     
( ) 1 ( )I
r
r F r
−Π = − =
−
θ ββ
θ θ
 (3)
for / / .rθ β θ β≤ ≤
Turning to GL, for pay-offs below br, a borrower prefers the penalty 
over repayment. For q
i
 no less than br but below 2br, borrower i is 
willing to repay an individual loan but not a group loan. For q
i
 ≥ 2br, the 
borrower prefers to repay two loans over default. If ( )/ 2 ,r θ β>  
borrowers are unwilling to repay two loans even if the maximum pay-off 
materialises. It turns out that such interest rates cannot occur in 
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equilibrium (cf. ‘Equilibrium’ section), so in the main text we restrict 
attention to interest rates
        2
r≤ ≤θ θβ β  (4)
when considering GL. BC (p. 17) characterise the subgame-perfect 
Nash equilibria (SPNE) of the repayment game. Six cases have to be 
distinguished (see Figure 1):
(1)  When both borrowers’ pay-offs fall short of br, then the group 
defaults.
(2)  When both borrowers’ pay-offs are not less than br but insuffi-
cient to induce them to repay two loans (i.e., less than 2br), both 
borrowers choosing to contribute is an equilibrium. Both borrow-
ers deciding not to contribute is also an SPNE, which is however 
ruled out by BC (p. 7) on the grounds that it is Pareto-inferior. An 
alternative way to get rid of this ‘bad’ equilibrium is elimination 
of weakly dominated strategies (cf. Fudenberg and Tirole 2000, 
Subsection 1.1.2): The strategy not to contribute at stage 1 is 
weakly dominated by the strategy to contribute.





 

 

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Figure 1.	Cases	that	Lead	to	Repayment	(shaded	area)	or	Default	(non-
shaded	area)	as	an	SPNE	with	GL
Source: Developed	by	the	authors.
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(3)  When each borrower is willing to repay two loans, one borrower 
repays 2r and the other free-rides.8
(4)  When one borrower is willing to repay one loan but not two loans 
and the other borrower is willing to repay two loans, the former 
free-rides and the latter repays both loans.
   In all these cases, the repayment per loan received by the MFI is 
the same as with IL.
(5)  When one borrower is willing to repay one loan but not two 
(i.e., her pay-off is no less than br but less than 2br) and the 
other borrower’s pay-off falls short of br, then the group defaults. 
This is the drawback of GL: joint liability discourages a bor-
rower who would repay an individual loan from repaying any-
thing at all.
(6)  When one borrower’s pay-off is no less than 2br and the other bor-
rower’s pay-off falls short of br, the high-return borrower stands 
in for her fellow group member. This is the advantage of GL.
The repayment rate is the cumulated probability of cases (2)–(4) and 
(6):
2
2 2 2
2
( ) 2[1 (2 )] ( ) [1 ( )]
3 4 2
.
( )
G r F r F r F r
r r
β β β
β βθ θ θθ
θ θ
Π = − + −
− + + −
=
−
 (5)
Comparing the repayment rates in (3) and (5) yields BC’s (p. 8) main 
result:
Proposition	1 (Besley and Coate 1995): (i) Suppose
         
1.
3
θ
β ≥  (6)
Then
      
( ) ( ) for
3G I
r r r
θ
βΠ ≥ Π ≤ ,
and vice versa. (ii) if ( )/ 3 1,θ β < ΠI (r) > ΠG (r) for all r ≥ 1. 
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Here and in what follows, we illustrate our results using a simple 
example9:
Example: Let 0.6, 5.5, 1.2θ θ β= = = . Equation (4) becomes 0.5 ≤ 
r ≤ 2.2917. The condition of part (i) of Proposition 1 is satisfied: 
( )/ 3 1.5278 1.θ β = ≥  The repayment rate is higher with GL or IL, 
depending on whether r < 1.5278 or r > 1.5278, respectively. 
Equilibrium
This section characterises the model equilibrium. We show that the scope 
for GL is more restricted than a comparison of repayment rates suggests: 
For a wide range of model parameters, IL is the equilibrium mode of 
finance, even though GL gives rise to a higher repayment rate at the 
break-even interest rate. We also demonstrate that the equilibrium possi-
bly displays financial fragility, redlining (if there are multiple borrower 
classes) or credit rationing (if capital supply is imperfectly elastic). 
Expected Repayments
From (3), the expected repayment per loan made with IL is
( ) ( ) 2I I r rR r r r β θθ θ
− +
≡ Π =
−
 (7)
for / /rθ β θ β.≤ ≤  RI(r) is hump-shaped with a maximum of maxIR ≡ 
/(2 at /(2IR  r =θ β θ β( )) ) . From (5), the expected repayment per loan 
made with GL is
2 3 2
2
3 4 2
( ) ( )G G
r + r r
R r r r
− β βθ θ θ θ
θ θ
+ ( − )  
≡ ∏ = ( − )
 (8)
for / / 2rθ β θ β .≤ ≤ ( )  RG(r) is a hump-shaped function over the interval 
in (4) with a maximum maxGR at an interest rate 
max
Gr  between / 3θ β( ) and
/ 2θ β ( ) (see Appendix 1). As in other models of imperfect enforcement, 
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for both lending types the impact of a further increase in the interest rate 
on expected repayment becomes negative as the interest rate grows 
large. Here the maximum expected return is unambiguously higher with 
IL than with GL:
Proposition	2: .max maxI GR > R
Proof: From the definition of expected repayment, R
I 
(r) > R
G 
(r) if, and 
only if, Π
I
(r) > Π
G
(r). (i) From Proposition 1, ( ) ( )I GR r R r> for /(3 )r θ β>  
if (6) holds. Using the fact that /(3 ) /(2 ),maxGrθ β θ β< <  it follows that
( ) ( )max max max maxI I G G G GR R r R r R> > =
(cf. Figure 2). (ii) For /(3 ) < 1,θ β the assertion follows directly from the 
fact that Π
I 
(r) > Π
G 
(r) for all r ≥ 1.
For future reference, denote the common value of R
I 
(r) and R
G 
(r) at 
ˆ/ as :r Rθ β= (3 )  
        
22  ˆ
9
R
θ
β θ θ≡ . ( − )  (9)
Further, denote the lowest interest rate that breaks even with IL (i.e., 
the smallest solution to R
I 
(r) = r) as r
I
 (if it exists, i.e., if ).maxIR≤ρ  
Analogously, r
G
 is the lowest break-even interest rate with GL: R
G 
(r
G
)
(if ).maxG Rρ ρ= ≤
Example: In the example introduced in the preceding section, R
I
(r) 
attains its maximum 1.2861maxIR =  at ( )/ 2 2.2917,r θ β= = and RG(r) 
attains its maximum 1.1462maxGR =  at r = 1.5912. The expected repay-
ment at the intersection of the two curves (i.e., at r = 1.5278) is ˆ 1.1432R =  
(see Figure 2).
Expected Utility and Equilibrium
All borrowers demand loans at any interest rate. For IL, this is because 
the cost of a loan (i.e., either the interest repayment or the penalty) is less 
 at Universitatsbibliothek on August 26, 2016emf.sagepub.comDownloaded from 
72	 Lutz G. Arnold, Johannes Reeder and Susanne Steger
Journal of Emerging Market Finance, 12, 1 (2013): 59–106
than the pay-off in every state of nature: min{q
i
/b, r} < q
i
. The same 
holds true for GL: In none of the cases (1)–(6) discussed in the previous 
section does a borrower i repay an amount that exceeds q
i
. In order to 
determine borrowers’ expected utility, we have to make an assumption 
about the probability of being the borrower who repays or the free rider 
in case (3). The natural assumption is that each borrower has an equal 
chance of being the free rider: 
Assumption	4: The probability of being a borrower who repays in case 
(3) under GL is 50 per cent for each borrower.10 
For r such that (4) holds, borrowers’ expected utility is
2 2 2 22 (1 )
( )
2 ( )I
r r
U r
β βθ βθ β θ
β θ θ
− + + −
=
−
 (10)
with IL and, given Assumption 4,
3 3 2 2 2 2
2 2 3
2
4 4 )
( )
( )
2 ( )G
r r r
U r
β β θ β θ θ θθ
βθ θ θθ θ β θ
β θ θ
− + (2 − 2 + +
− − ) − (1−
=
−
 (11)
with GL (see Appendix 1). 
4)
T 4+
T TU șȕ șȕ  ȕș   
Figure 2.	Example:	IL	versus	GL
Source:	 Developed	by	the	authors.
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According to Assumption 3, MFIs maximise borrowers’ expected 
utility subject to their break-even constraint. So an equilibrium of 
the model consists of a lending type (IL or GL) and an interest rate such 
that
1. the expected return on lending is r and
2. there is no other lending type–interest rate pair that yields a higher 
expected return and at least as high a level of borrowers’ expected 
utility.
If we interpret MFIs as for-profits, this is the natural notion of equili-
brium for a competitive market: There are no unexploited profit oppor-
tunities for profit-seeking lenders. If, by contrast, we think of a market 
that is dominated by not-for-profits, then equilibrium entails that the 
lenders put the money under their management to its best use: they 
cannot economise on their lending without worsening their borrowers’ 
position.11 For the sake of simplicity, we assume that GL is chosen when 
both types of lending yield the same level of expected borrower 
utility.
The following proposition states the obvious fact that if it is possible 
to break even with IL but not with GL, then there is an equilibrium 
with IL. 
Proposition	3: If max maxI GR Rρ≥ > , (IL, rI) is an equilibrium.12
Proof: From the definition of r
I
, (IL, r
I
) satisfies condition 1 in the defi-
nition of an equilibrium. The condition of the proposition implies that it 
is not possible to make positive profit with a GL contract. To achieve 
R
I 
(r) > r, an MFI must set an interest rate r > r
I
. However, from (10), 
( ) 0IU r′ < for all /r θ β.<  This proves the validity of condition 2 in the 
definition of an equilibrium.
Propositions 2 and 3 jointly provide one reason for the use of IL as the 
equilibrium mode of finance. From Proposition 2, the maximum return 
on lending is higher with IL than with GL. Therefore, if the cost of capi-
tal is high enough, GL does not break even and IL is used in equilibrium 
(Proposition 3).
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When is GL Used in Equilibrium?
In this subsection, we address the more interesting question of which 
type of lending survives competition if GL can also break even, so that it 
cannot be ruled out as the equilibrium lending type on a priori grounds. 
From the definition of equilibrium, the choice of the equilibrium mode 
of finance then depends on expected borrower utilities. The following 
result provides a constructive approach to finding equilibria in that case: 
all one has to do is compare expected borrower utility (or, equivalently, 
the deadweight losses induced by the different lending types) at the min-
imum break-even interest rates. 
Proposition	4: If maxGR ρ≥ ,  (IL, rI) or (GL, rG) is an equilibrium, depen-
ding on whether U
I 
(r
I
) > U
G 
(r
G
) or U
G 
(r
G
) ≥ U
I 
(r
I
), respectively. 
Proof: Since ,max maxI GR > R  both lending types break even for sufficiently 
high interest. By virtue of the definitions of r
I
 and r
G
, both (IL, r
I
) 
and (GL, r
G
) satisfy condition 1 in the definition of an equilibrium. 
To check the validity of condition 2, consider first the case U
I 
(r
I
) > U
G 
(r
G
). The proposition asserts that (IL, r
I
) is an equilibrium. By the same 
reasoning as in the proof of Proposition 3, it is not possible to make a 
profit with IL at an interest rate r ≠ r
I
. As for GL, since r
G
 is the lowest 
break-even interest rate, R
G 
(r) > r requires r > r
G
. But such interest rates 
do not attract customers:
U
G 
(r) < U
G 
(r
G
) < U
I 
(r
I
),
where use is made of ( ) 0GU r′ < for all r that satisfy (4) (see Appendix 1). 
Thus, given IL at r
I
, it is not possible to achieve a repayment above r and 
attract borrowers with either a different IL contract or GL. The case U
G 
(r
G
) ≥ U
I 
(r
I
) is treated analogously. MFIs have to charge an interest rate 
r > r
G
 in order to get a repayment R
G 
(r) > r with GL. Since ( ) 0GU r′ < , 
there is no demand for such contracts. Since ( ) 0 and ( ) 0,I IR r U r> <′ ′  an 
IL contract that yields R
I 
(r) > r requires r > r
I
 and, therefore, does not 
attract customers either:
U
I 
(r) < U
I 
(r
I
) ≤ U
G 
(r
G
).
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In Appendix 1, we show that the arguments go through without modi-
fication when r is not in the interval in (4).
We are now in a position to prove our first main result: GL may not 
be used in equilibrium, even though it breaks even at a lower interest rate 
and leads to the higher repayment rate at the break-even interest rate than 
IL. This will happen if the cost of capital r is less than, but sufficiently 
close to, ˆ :R
Proposition	5: Let condition (6) of Proposition 1 be satisfied and ˆ 1.R >  
Then there exists ˆˆ R<ρ  such that for r in the interval ˆˆ ],R( ,ρ  (IL, r
I
) is 
an equilibrium, even though r
G
 ≤ r
I
 and Π
G
(r
G
) ≥ Π
I
 (r
I
).
Proof: Define D
I
 (r) and D
G 
(r) as the expected penalties with IL and GL, 
respectively:
       
2 2 2
( )
2 ( )I
r
D r
β θ
β θ θ
−
=
−
 (12)
and
   
3 3 2 2 2 3
2
5 4 2
( )
2 ( )G
r r r
D r
β β θ βθ θ
β θ θ
− − +
=
−
 (13)
(see Appendix 1). From (12) and (13), the expected penalty is strictly 
higher with GL than with IL at /(3 )r θ β=  if, and only if, /3θ θ>  (see 
Appendix 1). The validity of this inequality follows from (2) and (6). By 
continuity of the polynomials in (12) and (13), D
G 
(r) > D
I 
(r) for r less 
than, but sufficiently close to, /(3 )θ β . It follows that there exists ˆˆ R<ρ  
such that D
G 
(r
G
) > D
I 
(r
I
) for r in the interval ˆˆ( , ].Rρ  Since the penalties 
are the only deadweight loss in the model, we have
     E(q) – D
I 
(r) = U
I 
(r) + R
I 
(r) (14)
and a similar equation for GL.13 From R
I
 (r
I
) = R
G 
(r
G
) = r and D
G 
(r
G
) > 
D
I 
(r
I
), it follows that U
I 
(r
I
) > U
G 
(r
G
). From Proposition 4, IL is used 
in equilibrium, even though r
G
 ≤ r
I
 (since Rˆ≤ρ ). From R
I 
(r
I
) = R
G 
(r
G
) 
= r, R
G 
(r) ≡ Π
G 
(r)r, and R
I 
(r) ≡ Π
I 
(r)r, r
G
 ≤ r
I
 is equivalent to Π
G 
(r
G
) ≥ 
Π
I 
(r
I
).
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Proposition 5 states that large deadweight losses potentially discour-
age the use of GL in equilibrium even if it looks favourable in terms of 
repayment rates. This is a straightforward consequence of the basic 
model mechanisms, viz., the assumptions that a borrower is fully liable 
for the group loan if her peer group member decides not to contribute 
and that the penalty is an increasing function of the project pay-off. To 
see this, recall that the reason why GL is not unambiguously preferable 
to IL is that GL discourages the high-q borrower from repaying in 
case (5). The expected penalty on the high-q borrower, conditional on 
the occurrence of case (5), is
2
3
,
(2 ) ( ) 2
E r r
r
F r F r
θ β θ ββ
β β
 
≤ <  
=
−
that is, one-and-a-half times the contractual interest payment.14 With IL, 
by contrast, the penalty q/b is always less than r, since the borrower 
repays whenever q/b ≥ r. Thus, the penalties under GL can be substantial 
if they are exerted.15
Example: From (10) and (11), U
G 
(r
G
) ≥ U
I 
(r
I
) for 1 ≤ r ≤ 1.0798, 
whereas U
I 
(r
I
) > U
G 
(r
G
) for 1.0798 < r ≤ 1.1432. That is, IL is used in 
equilibrium for ((1.1432 – 1.0798)/(1.1432 – 1) =) 44.27 per cent of the 
values of the cost of capital r for which GL breaks even at a lower inter-
est rate than IL. For instance, let the cost of capital be r = 1.1. The mini-
mum break-even interest rate is lower with GL than with IL: r
G
 = 1.3331 
< 1.4198 = r
I 
(see Figure 2). The respective repayment rates 
are 82.52 per cent and 77.47 per cent. Nonetheless, the equilibrium 
entails IL, because this yields higher expected borrower utility: U
I 
(r
I
) = 
1.7338 > 1.7176 = U
G 
(r
G
) (alternatively, the deadweight loss is 
lower: D
I 
(r
I
) = 0.2162 < 0.2324 = D
G 
(r
G
)). The expected penalty on the 
high-q borrower in case (5) with GL at zero profit is (3r
G
/2 = ) 
1.9996. This compares with penalties below r
I
 = 1.4198 with IL at zero 
profit.
To check whether the result that IL is used for a sizeable proportion 
of values of the cost of capital that imply r
G
 < r
I
 is robust, we investigate 
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a wide array of parameter values. We consider 11 different values for 
each of the parameters ,θ θ  and b:
θ  ∈ {0.01, 0.2, 0.4, . . . , 1.8, 2}
θ  ∈ {2.01, 2.7, 3.4, . . . , 8.3, 9}
b ∈ {1.01, 1.2, 1.4, . . . , 2.8, 3}
(with the cost of capital r yet to be specified). Of the resulting 1,331 
parameter combinations, we pick those which satisfy (1), (2) and ˆ 1R ≥ . 
For each of these 223 parameter combinations, we compute the critical 
level of the cost of capital ρˆ  such that for r in the interval ˆˆ( , ],Rρ  IL is 
used in equilibrium even though GL has the lower break-even interest 
rate (i.e., r
G
 < r
I
). We define
ˆ ˆ
ˆ 1
R
P
R
−
≡
−
ρ
as the proportion of r-values which give rise to IL in equilibrium 
conditional on GL having the lower break-even interest rate for a given 
set of parameters ,θ θ and b. P ranges between 10.03 per cent and 
100 per cent. The unweighted average over the 223 cases is 44.24 per cent. 
This demonstrates that the use of IL in equilibrium despite the higher 
break-even interest rate is not an artefact of our running example. It 
happens for about half the r-values that give rise to G Ir r≤ .
Market Failure and Optimal Contracts
The market equilibrium possibly displays the types of market failure 
discussed in the theory of asymmetric information in credit markets. 
This is a direct consequence of the hump shape of the expected repayment 
functions (cf. Figure 2). First, there is financial fragility in that a small 
change in a model parameter can lead to a discontinuous change in 
the equilibrium values of the endogenous variables: When r rises 
above maxIR the market breaks down completely, since the lenders’ return 
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expectations can no longer be met. Second, when there are several 
markets of the type described in the ‘Model’ section with possibly 
different parameter values, only borrowers in markets with maxIR ≥ ρ 
will receive credit, the borrowers in the other classes are ‘redlined’. 
Third, if contrary to what has been assumed so far, the supply of capital 
is an imperfectly elastic function of r, then credit rationing occurs when 
the supply of capital at maxIR  falls short of demand. Lenders then do not 
have an incentive to raise the interest rate despite the excess demand 
because that would decrease their expected repayment.16
Since the maximum expected repayment maxIR  is achieved with IL 
here, financial fragility and credit rationing can only prevail when the 
equilibrium type of finance is IL, and individual loans are used before 
any borrower class is redlined as r rises. As will become clear in the 
sections ‘Social Capital’ and ‘Conclusion’, in the presence of coopera-
tive behaviour or social sanctions these market failures can happen when 
GL is the equilibrium mode of finance.17
The definition of equilibrium entails that MFIs use the best (IL or GL) 
contract in terms of borrowers’ expected utility given the penalty func-
tion p(q). Whether or not this is an optimal contract depends on whether 
or not the penalty function p(q) is considered exogenous or not. If it is 
not, that is, if p(q) can be chosen freely by the MFIs, then p(q) = q/b in 
conjunction with full liability for one’s peer group member’s loan is evi-
dently not optimal: Given symmetric information, the first-best solution 
(no default, no penalties in equilibrium) can easily be achieved by means 
of the threat of sufficiently severe penalties which will not be imple-
mented in equilibrium. For instance, r = r and p(q) = 2r will do. 
Appendix 2 provides further discussion of the issue of optimal contracts 
(cf. Rai and Sjöström 2004; Bhole and Ogden 2010). However, it can be 
argued that assuming that p(q) can be chosen freely eliminates the sub-
stance of the model. The model is about making loans in an environment 
with imperfect enforcement of financial claims. So the penalty function 
p(q) should be considered as a measure of the prevailing difficulties of 
enforcing contractual payments, and if p(q) can be chosen freely, the 
problem vanishes altogether. Moreover, in view of the fact that the 
underlying problem is to make credit available to the poor, the advice 
that enforcement can be improved by means of harsh punishments seems 
to be of limited practical significance.
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Social Capital
The analysis so far lends support to the widely held view that the scope 
for GL is rather limited if the sole characteristic of GL is joint liability. 
However, as emphasised by Armendáriz de Aghion and Morduch (2000), 
among others, there are other dimensions to GL contracts. In this section, 
we introduce additional enforcement mechanisms to the model that rely 
on the use of social capital. We show that this not only improves expected 
repayments with GL but does so in a way that promotes the use of GL 
rather than IL in equilibrium.
Cooperative Behaviour
In this subsection, following Ahlin and Townsend (2007, Subsection 
1.3.2), we assume that borrowers play the repayment game coopera-
tively rather than non-cooperatively:
Assumption	5: The borrowers 1 and 2 in a group repay if, and only if, 2r 
≤ p(q
1
) + p(q
2
). They share the pay-offs q
1
 + q
2
 such that both get the 
same expected utility.
Using p(q) = q/b, it follows that the members of a group repay 
whenever q
1
 + q
2
 ≥ 2br. Equal expected utilities could be achieved, for 
example, by sharing q
1
 + q
2
 – min{2r, (q
1
 + q
2
)/b} equally for all possible 
realisations (q
1
, q
2
).
In terms of Figure 3, the two members of a group repay for (q
1
, q
2
) on 
and above the line with slope –1 through (br, br). As in the non-
cooperative repayment game, the members of a group repay nothing in 
case (1) and 2r in cases (2)–(4) and (6). Cooperation is conducive to the 
repayment rate under GL because in the fields corresponding to case (5) 
in Figure 3, they default only in the area below the line q
1
 + q
2
 = 2br. One 
can infer from Figure 3 that the repayment rate with GL is higher than 
with IL: The repayments with GL or IL are the same in cases (1)–(4). 
With GL, both group members repay in field (5) above the line q
1
 + q
2
 = 
2br and in field (6), whereas both default in field (5) below the line q
1
 + 
q
2
 = 2br. With IL, by contrast, one of the two borrowers repays in cases 
(5) and (6). Since the area of the non-shaded portion of field (5) with GL 
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is less than half the total area of fields (5) and (6), given the uniform 
distribution of (q
1
, q
2
), the repayment rate is higher with GL than with IL 
(cf. Ahlin and Townsend 2007, Proposition 8, p. F24).
The repayment rate is 2 21 [(2 ) ] /[2( ) ]rβ θ θ θ θ− − − − , and the expec-
ted repayment is
    
2 2
2
( ) 2( )
( )
( )C
r
R r r
− − −
=
−
θ θ β θ
θ θ
 (15)
for
        2
r
+≤ ≤θ θ θβ β . (16)
For interest rates that satisfy (16), R
C 
(r) has the familiar hump shape 
(see Appendix 1). The interest rate that maximises the expected 
repayment is denoted as maxCr  and the corresponding expected repay- 
ment as ( ( ))max maxC C CR R r≡ . In the main text, we restrict attention to 
interest rates which satisfy (16). In Appendix 1, we show that the analy-
sis readily extends to interest rates ( )/(2 )r θ θ β> + . Notice that (16) 
implies (4): ( )/(2 ) /θ θ β θ β+ < . From (7) and (15), R
C 
(r) ≥ R
I 
(r) for 
all r such that (16) holds (see Appendix 1). Let r
C
 be the minimum 
break-even interest rate with GL (provided that maxCR ρ≥ ). The fact that 
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Figure 3. Repayment	(shaded	area)	versus	Default	(non-shaded	area)	with	
Cooperative	Behaviour
Source: Developed	by	the	authors.
 at Universitatsbibliothek on August 26, 2016emf.sagepub.comDownloaded from 
Viability of Group Lending	 81
Journal of Emerging Market Finance, 12, 1 (2013): 59–106
R
C 
(r) ≥ R
I 
(r) implies r
C
 ≤ r
I
 whenever break even with IL is possible 
(i.e., maxIR ρ≥ ). The deadweight loss per loan made with GL is
    
3 3 2 2 3
2
4 6 2
( )
3 ( )C
r r
D r
− +
=
−
β β θ θ
β θ θ  (17)
for r such that (16) holds (see Appendix 1). The following proposition 
states that cooperation among the members of a borrower group is 
sufficient in order to turn GL into the equilibrium type of finance:
Proposition	6: (GL, r
C
) is an equilibrium whenever maxCR ρ≥ .
Proof: For r such that ,max maxC IR Rρ≥ >  GL is used in equilibrium 
because IL does not break even. So we can focus on the case .maxIR ρ≥
The deadweight loss with GL D
C 
(r) satisfies
     E(q) – D
C 
(r) = U
C 
(r) + R
C 
(r). (18)
For r = r
C
, this becomes E(q) – D
C 
(r
C
) = U
C 
(r
C
) + r. To achieve 
R
C 
(r) > r and U
C 
(r) ≥ U
C 
(r
C
) with GL at r ≠ r
C
, the deadweight loss must 
be smaller:
D
C 
(r) < D
C 
(r
C
).
However, since r
C
 is the minimum break-even interest rate, R
C 
(r) > r 
requires r > r
C
. Since 
C
D′ (r) > 0 for all /r θ β>  (see Appendix 1), this 
implies
D
C 
(r) > D
C 
(r
C
),
a contradiction. So there is no profitable GL contract that attracts 
borrowers.
Similarly, from (14) and (18), an IL contract with R
I 
(r) > r and U
I 
(r) 
≥ U
C 
(r
C
) must satisfy
D
I 
(r) < D
C 
(r
C
)
and, as r
I
 is the minimum break-even interest rate, r > r
I
. Without loss of 
generality, we can assume ( )/ 2 .r θ β≤  This is because for any interest 
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rate above /(2 )θ β  that breaks even, there is a lower interest rate that 
yields the same expected repayment and, as ( )ID r >0′ (from (12)), a 
lower deadweight loss. Consequently, (16) is satisfied so that (17) gives 
the deadweight loss with GL. It is straightforward to show that 
( ) ( )C ID r < D r  for all /(2 )r θ β≤  if /7.2749θ θ<  (see Appendix 1). 
Using I Cr r r> ≥  and ( ) 0ID r >′ , it then follows that
D
I 
(r) > D
I 
(r
I
) ≥ D
I 
(r
C
) ≥ D
C 
(r
C
),
a contradiction. A different argument is needed to prove the assertion of 
the proposition when /7.2749θ θ<  does not hold (one may skip this 
argument if one accepts this sufficient condition). Since this part of the 
proof is more complicated, it is delegated to Appendix 1.
The proof goes through without modification when we allow for 
( )(2 )r θ θ β> +  (see Appendix 1). So with cooperative behaviour, 
GL not only yields the higher repayment rate but also becomes the 
equilibrium lending type. This result lends support to the view that other 
mechanisms besides joint liability are needed to make GL the equilibrium 
mode of finance. Here it is the fact that borrowers cooperate (with one 
another, not with the lender) in planning their repayments which makes 
GL attractive for them.
The market equilibrium is potentially characterised by the market 
failures discussed in the preceding section. This follows immediately 
from the fact that the expected repayment function R
C 
(r) has the familiar 
hump shape, so that borrowers cease to get funds when r rises beyond 
max
CR  and positive excess demand at 
max
Cr  does not lead to an increase in 
the interest rate (when the supply of capital is imperfectly elastic). Thus, 
GL with cooperative repayment behaviour does not eliminate the market 
failures introduced in the preceding section. However, since ,max maxC IR R>  
the level of the cost of capital at which lending breaks down and the 
supply of capital in a rationing equilibrium are higher with GL (given 
positively and imperfectly elastic supply). In this sense, GL ameliorates 
the market failures.
Example: In the example with 0.6, 5.5= =θ θ , b = 1.2 and r = 1.1, 
the equilibrium interest rate is r
C
 = 1.1608. The repayment rate and 
expected utility rise to 94.76 per cent and 1.9007, respectively. R
C
(r) 
achieves its maximum 1.4603maxCR =  at 2.0087
max
Cr = . While with 
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non-cooperative behaviour the market breaks down when r rises 
beyond 1.2861, an equilibrium exists for costs of capital up to 1.4603 
here (see Figure 4). To illustrate the possibility of credit rationing in an 
equilibrium with GL, suppose there is a unit mass of borrowers and 
the supply of capital is S(r) = 0.6163r. Given zero profit for MFIs, the 
maximum feasible gross return is 1.4603maxSR = , and the corresponding 
supply of capital is S(1.4603) = 0.9. So in equilibrium 10 per cent of the 
borrowers are rationed, even though the expected project pay-off 
( )/2 3.05θ θ+ =  exceeds the gross return needed to induce a capital sup-
ply equal to total demand significantly (S(1.6226) = 1). However, com-
pared to the case of non-cooperative behaviour, the situation improves: 
In the equilibrium without cooperation, IL generates the maximum gross 
return 1.2861maxIR = . The supply of capital is 0.7926, and 20.74 per cent 
of the borrowers are rationed.
Social Sanctions
Following BC (Section 4), we next introduce social sanctions to 
the model of the ‘Model’ section (returning to the assumption of 
U      
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Figure 4. Example:	IL	versus	GL	with	Cooperative	Behaviour
Source: Developed	by	the	authors.
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non-cooperative behaviour in the repayment game). BC’s main result in 
this regard is that if social sanctions are severe enough, GL yields a higher 
repayment rate than IL (BC, Proposition 3, p. 12). We show that, like 
cooperative behaviour among group members, social sanctions also make 
GL the equilibrium type of finance and ameliorate market failures.
We adopt the following simple specification of social sanctions:
Assumption	 6: If one borrower i in a group decides to contribute at 
stage 1 of the repayment game and her fellow group member j decides 
not to contribute, then i imposes a sanction s > r on j. No sanctions are 
imposed otherwise.18
The presence of the sanction strengthens the incentives to contribute 
in the repayment game. For the cases defined in the section ‘Repayment 
Rates’ (cf. Figures 1 and 3), the following SPNE arise ( r < θ β  or 
r > θ β  can be ruled out using the same arguments as in the section 
‘Repayment Rates’):
1. Both borrowers choosing not to contribute is an SPNE. Due to the 
threat of penalties, both borrowers choosing to contribute is also 
an SPNE. As in the section ‘Repayment Rates’, the latter SPNE is 
ruled out on the grounds that it is Pareto-inferior.19
2. Both borrowers choosing to contribute is an equilibrium. The 
other SPNE, in which both borrowers decide not to contribute, is 
ruled out on the grounds that it is Pareto-inferior.
3. Contributing is a strictly dominant strategy at stage 1 for both bor-
rowers. Neither tries to free-ride.
4. Contributing is a strictly dominant strategy for the borrower i with 
q
i
 ≥ 2br and a weakly dominant strategy for the other borrower. 
The unique SPNE entails repayment.
5. This is the critical case for GL. Borrower 1, say, has a pay-off θ
1
 in 
the interval (br, 2br), borrower 2’s pay-off falls short of br. 
Contributing is a weakly dominant strategy for both borrowers at 
stage 1 (see Figure 5): if borrower 2 chooses not to contribute 
at stage 1 and borrower 1 decides to contribute, borrower 2 knows 
that borrower 1 will choose default at stage 2. Given Assumption 6, 
the social sanction s imposed on her weighs more heavily than the 
interest payment r (and the penalty q
1
/b strengthens the case for 
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repayment). So repayment becomes an SPNE. Both borrowers 
choosing not to contribute is also an SPNE, which can be ruled out 
using elimination of weakly dominated strategies, however (the 
Pareto criterion is inconclusive here).
6. The unique SPNE entails that both borrowers contribute.
GL with social sanctions fares unambiguously better than GL with 
cooperative behaviour in terms of repayment rates. Repayment occurs 
except in case (1), so the non-shaded default area in Figure 3 shrinks. 
This confirms Ahlin and Townsend’s (2007, Proposition 8, p. F24) find-
ing that sufficiently severe social sanctions (‘unofficial penalties’) can 
enforce a higher repayment rate than cooperation. GL with social sanc-
tions also dominates IL. Again, this follows from the fact that it reduces 
the default area to field (1) (whereas one of the two borrowers in a group 
defaults in the fields labeled (5) and (6) with IL, cf. Figure 1). We show 
in the following that this implies that lenders use GL, rather than IL, in 
equilibrium. The fact that GL with social sanctions dominates coopera-
tion and IL is due to the fact that social sanctions are not carried out in 
equilibrium, so they do not cause any deadweight losses in addition to 
the penalties imposed by lenders.
The repayment rate becomes
   
2 2 2
2
2
2 2
( ) 1 ( )
( )S
r r
r F r
β βθ θ θθβ
θ θ
− + + −Π = − =
−
 (19)
for / /rθ β θ β≤ ≤ . From (3) and (19), Π
S 
(r) > Π
I 
(r) whenever F(br) < 1, 
that is, /r θ β< . The expected repayment with GL is R
S 
(r) ≡ Π
S 
(r)r. 
$QTTQYGT%QPVTKDWVG $QTTQYGT%QPVTKDWVG &QPyV&QPyV TŦTTŦT TETí  TET í Ŧ5TETí í5 TET í TET í TET í
Figure 5. Stage	1	of	the	Repayment	Game	with	Social	Sanctions,	Case	(5)
Source: Developed	by	the	authors.
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R
S 
(r) has the usual hump shape over the interval [ / , / ]θ β θ β , with a unique 
maximum maxSR  at 
max
Sr , say (see Appendix 1). GL is the equilibrium 
mode of finance. Letting r
S
 denote the minimum break-even interest rate 
with GL, we have:
Proposition	7: If maxSR ≥ ρ, (GL, rS) is an equilibrium.
Proof: If ,max maxS IR Rρ≥ > only GL breaks even, so we can focus on 
.maxIR ρ≥  The deadweight loss with GL is
   
3 3 2 2 2 3
2
( )
2 ( )S
r r r
D r
− − +
≡
−
β β θ βθ θ
β θ θ  (20)
(see Appendix 1). Increases in the interest rate raise the deadweight loss: 
S
D′ (r) > 0 for all r > /θ β  (see Appendix 1). From (12) and (20), D
S 
(r) 
≤ D
I 
(r) for / /rθ β θ β≤ ≤ (see Appendix 1). With GL at r = r
S
,
E(q) – D
S 
(r
S
) = U
S 
(r
S
) + r.
R
S 
(r) > r and U
S 
(r) ≥ U
S 
(r
S
) for r ≠ r
S
 requires
D
S 
(r) < D
S
 (r
S
).
However, D
S 
(r) > D
S 
(r
S
), since r
S
 is the minimum break-even interest 
rate (so that r > r
S
) and ( ) 0,SD r >′  a contradiction.
Similarly, an IL contract that yields R
I 
(r) > r and U
I 
(r) ≥ U
S 
(r
S
) must 
satisfy
D
I 
(r) < D
S 
(r
S
).
However, r > r
I
 > r
S
, since r
I
 is the minimum break-even interest rate 
with IL, R
I 
(r) > ρ, and R
I 
(r) < R
S 
(r) for / /rθ β θ β< < . Using the fact 
that ( ) 0ID r >′  and DS (r) ≤ DI (r) for / /rθ β θ β≤ ≤ , it follows that
D
I 
(r) > D
I 
(r
I
) ≥ D
I 
(r
S
) ≥ D
S 
(r
S
),
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a contradiction. Hence, it is not possible to enter the market with either 
an alternative GL or an IL contract.
To complete the proof, we have to show that the borrowers demand 
funds at interest rates up to .maxSr  This is non-trivial here because in cases 
(5) and (6) the low-q borrower repays even though r > q for q small 
enough. The proof that expected utility is nonetheless non-negative is in 
Appendix 1.20
The conclusions are similar as in the model with cooperative 
behaviour in the repayment game. Adding a form of social capital 
that fosters repayment with GL is sufficient to ensure that GL is used 
in equilibrium. Social sanctions do not eliminate, but do ameliorate, 
financial fragility, redlining and credit rationing.
Example: In the running example, the equilibrium GL interest rate is 
r
S
 = 1.1265. The repayment rate and expected utility rise further to 97.65 
per cent and 1.9309, respectively. A market equilibrium exists for r up 
to ( ) 1.9163maxSR r =  (see Figure 6).
Conclusion
Without cooperative behaviour or social sanctions, there is even less 
scope for GL as the equilibrium mode of finance in the BC model than a 
   U 4+
T 45
T 
 TETET 
Figure 6. Example:	IL	versus	GL	with	Social	Sanctions
Source: Developed	by	the	authors.
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comparison of repayment rates suggests. This supports the widely held 
view that joint liability alone is not sufficient to explain the apparent suc-
cess of GL. GL is used in equilibrium and effectively helps reduce dead-
weight losses if borrowers play cooperatively or discipline each other by 
means of social sanctions. This underlines the important role of enforce-
ment mechanisms beyond joint liability that rely on some form of social 
capital for the effectiveness of GL.
The increasing commercialisation of microfinance calls for equili-
brium models of microfinance markets. The aim of the present article is 
to go one step in this direction by conducting an equilibrium analysis of 
one of the most prominent microfinance models. An important direction 
for future research is to embed partial equilibrium models of microfi-
nance markets into general equilibrium models, in which MFIs compete 
for loanable funds with financial institutions active in other financial 
markets and, more generally, in which different sectors compete for the 
economy’s scarce resources. Such models allow us to address the 
important question of whether and how microfinance can spur eco-
nomic development. Recent research by Ahlin and Jiang (2008) high-
lights that we must not expect simple or general answers. They 
demonstrate that if entrepreneurs (whose activity is necessary for 
full-scale development) compete for workers with self-employment 
opportunities, microfinance programmes that successfully draw 
workers from subsistence work to self-employment may at the same 
time prevent full-scale economic development. Much more work is 
needed to clarify the issue of how microfinance programmes have to 
be designed in order to initiate and sustain development processes. 
Another interesting direction of future research would be to replace the 
(non-pecuniary) penalties with the threat of exclusion from future credit 
as in Bhole and Ogden (2010).
Leaving the confines of the model, an important question with regard 
to microfinance’s move towards markets is whether the enforcement of 
repayment via cooperation or social sanctions works equally well 
irrespective of the type of the lending institutions active in the supply of 
microcredit. Is borrowers’ decision to impose sanctions on each other 
independent of whether they default on a loan refinanced by a non-profit 
development finance institution or by the microfinance arm of an inter-
national commercial bank? Starting with Titmuss’s (1970) study of 
 at Universitatsbibliothek on August 26, 2016emf.sagepub.comDownloaded from 
Viability of Group Lending	 89
Journal of Emerging Market Finance, 12, 1 (2013): 59–106
blood donations, it has become clear that market mechanisms potentially 
crowd out contributions motivated by non-pecuniary objectives (for a 
recent reassessment, see Mellström and Johannesson 2008).21 If the 
move towards markets crowds out the social capital that is essential 
in order to make GL work, commercial banks’ choice is the one descri-
bed in the section ‘Equilibrium’: As stipulated by Cull et al. (2009: 189), 
profit-seeking MFIs entering the microfinance market ‘are more likely… 
to involve an individual lending method’. But this might merely reflect 
their inability to exploit the advantages of GL offered by an efficient use 
of social capital.
Appendix 1. Details	of	Proofs
Proof	that	R
G 
(r)	takes	on	a	maximum	between	 /(3 )θ β 	and	 /(2 )θ β
The expected repayment function in (8) satisfies
2 2
2 ( 5 8 )
0
3 23( ) 4( )G G
R R
   − +
′ ′= > > =   
− −   
θ θθ θ θ θ θ
β βθ θ θ θ ,
where the latter inequality follows from (1). As R
G
(r) intersects the 
origin with positive slope, it follows that it takes on a local maximum at 
some maxGr  between /(3 )θ β  and /(2 )θ β .
Derivation	of	(10)	and	(11)
With IL, default occurs if, and only if, rθ θ β≤ < , so
( )
r
I r
r
U r d d
β θ
θ β
θθ θβ θ θ
θ θ θ θ
−
−
= +
− −
∫ ∫
                        
2 2 2 22 (1 )
.
2 ( )
r rβ βθ βθ β θ
β θ θ
− + + −
=
−  
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With GL, from Figure 1, default occurs if either 1 r≤ <θ θ β  and 
2 2 r≤ <θ θ β  or else 1 2r r≤ <β θ β  and 2 .rθ θ β≤ <  Hence, the sum 
of the two borrowers’ expected utilities U
G 
(r) is
1 2
1 2
2
1 2
2 2 12
1
2 ( )
r r
G r
r r
U r d d d
β β θ
θ θ β
θ θθ θ θ θβ β θ θ θ
θ θ θ θ θ θ
 
− + − 
− + −
= + 
− − −   
∫ ∫ ∫
            
1 2
1 2
2
1 2
2 2 1
1r r
r r
r r
d d d
β β θ
β θ β
θ θθ θ θ θβ β θ θ θ
θ θ θ θ θ θ
 
− + − 
− + −
+ + 
− − −   
∫ ∫ ∫
        
1 2
2 12
1
.
r
r r
d d
θ θ
β θ
θ θ θ θ
θ θ θ θ
− + −
+
− −
∫ ∫
Performing the integrations and simplifying terms yield (11).
Proof	that	 <( ) 0′GU r 	when	(4)	is	satisfied	(Proposition	4)
Differentiating (11) gives
2 2 2 2
2
3 8 2( 2 )
( )
2( )G
r r
U r
− + − +
′ =
−
β βθ θ θ θθ
θ θ
.
( ) 0GU r′ <  holds true whenever
2 2
2
2
8 2 2
0.
3 3
r r
θ θ θ θθ
β β
− +
− + <
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The roots of the polynomial on the left-hand side are
2
1/2
4 3 3 5
1 .
3 8 4 8
r
θ θ θ
β θ θ
   
= ± − +    
The discriminant is positive, so r
1/2
 are real. Let r
1
 be the smaller root. 
1 /r θ β>  is equivalent to
2
3
2 0.
2
θ θ
θ θ
 
− + <   
This contradicts (1), so 1 2/ . /(2 )r rθ β θ β≤ <  is equivalent to
2
8 8 3 3 5
.
3 3 8 4 8
θ θ θ
θ θ θ
 
> + − +  
The right-hand side of this inequality equals 4.7749 for / 2θ θ =  and its 
derivative with respect to /θ θ  exceeds unity for all / 2.θ θ ≥  So (1) 
contradicts the inequality, and we conclude 2 /(2 )r θ β≥ . This proves 
that ( ) 0GU r′ <  for interest rates that satisfy (4).
Proof	of	Propositions	3	and	4	when	condition	(4)	does	not	hold
For /r θ β< , the repayment rate is 100 per cent. Condition (2) implies 
that the certain repayment is less than one: / 1.r θ β< <  So it is not pos-
sible to break even with such interest rates.
Interest rates above /θ β  can be ruled out since they lead to default 
with certainty, irrespective of the lending type used, so that the outcome 
is the same as with / .r θ β=
Proposition 3 hinges upon the fact that if maxGRρ > , it is not possible to 
break even with GL. To prove that (4) is inessential to the validity of the 
proposition, we have to show that expected repayment falls short of maxGR  
for /(2 ).r θ β>
Proposition 4 makes use of the fact that expected borrower utility is a 
decreasing function of the interest rate. We have to show that this holds 
true for /(2 ).r θ β>
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For /(2 ),r θ β>  cases (3), (4) and (6) drop out (cf. Figure 1). The 
expected repayment function becomes
2 3 2 2
2
2
( )
( )

G
r r r
R r
β βθ θ
θ θ
− +
=
+
for /(2 ) / .rθ β θ β< ≤  Since
3
22 28 ( )G G
R R
θ θ θ
β ββ θ θ
   
= =   
−    ,
the expected repayment function is continuous. Furthermore, ( ) 0GR r′ =  
for r /(3 )θ β= and / .r θ β=  It follows that ( )GR r  is downward-sloping 
between /(2 ) and / .θ β θ β  This proves that maxGR  is the maximum attain able 
expected repayment.
Expected borrower utility becomes
3 3 2 2 2 3 2 2 3
2
3 3 (1 )( )
( )
2 ( )G
r r r
U r
β β θ βθ βθ β θ θ θθ θ
β θ θ
− + − + + − + −
=
−

for /(2 )r θ β> . It falls as the interest rate rises:
2
2
3( )
( ) 0.
2( )G
r
U' r
β θ
θ θ
−
= − <
−

Derivation	of	D
G 
(r)	(Proposition	5)
The expression for D
G 
(r) in (13) is obtained by performing the integra-
tions in
1
2 2
2 1 2 1
1 1
( )
I
r r r r
G r
D r d d d d
β β β β
θ θ β θ
θ θ
β βθ θ θ θ
θ θ θ θ θ θ θ θ
= +
− − − −
∫ ∫ ∫ ∫
and rearranging terms.
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Proof	that ( /(3 )) > ( /(3 ))G ID Dq qβ β  (Proposition	5)
From (12) and (13), D
G 
(r) > D
I 
(r) if, and only if,
2 23 3 2 25 ( 3 ) 2 0.r r rβ β θ θ βθ θθ− + − + >
The inequality holds true for /(3 )r θ β=  exactly if
2
9 9
0.
2 2
 
− + >   
θ θ
θ θ
The roots of the quadratic equation on the left-hand side are 3/2 and 3, so 
it takes on positive values for all /3 .θ θ>
Proof	that R
C 
(r)	is	hump-shaped	over	the	interval	defined	in	(16)
Differentiating the expression for R
C 
(r) in (15) yields
2 22 2
2
6 8 ( 2 )
( )
( )
C
r r
R r
β βθ θ θθ θ
θ θ
− + + − −
′ =
−
.
So
1 0CR
 
= >′   
θ
β
and
2 2
2
( ) 2 ( )
0.
2 2( )
CR
 + − + −
= − <′  
− 
θ θ θ θ θ θ θ
β θ θ
As R
C
(r) is a third-order polynomial with negative leading coefficient, 
it follows that it is hump-shaped over the interval / , ( )/(2 )][ +θ β θ θ β .
Proof	that R
C 
(r)	≥ R
I 
(r)	when	(16)	is	satisfied
From (7) and (15), R
C 
(r) ≥ R
I 
(r) exactly if
2
2
3 ( )
0.
2 2
r r
θ θ θ θ θ
β β
+ +
− + ≤
 at Universitatsbibliothek on August 26, 2016emf.sagepub.comDownloaded from 
94	 Lutz G. Arnold, Johannes Reeder and Susanne Steger
Journal of Emerging Market Finance, 12, 1 (2013): 59–106
The roots of the quadratic equation on the left-hand side are
/ and ( )/(2 ).r rθ β θ θ β= = +  So R
C 
(r) ≥ R
I 
(r) between these interest 
rates.
Derivation	of	(17)
From Figure 3, the sum of the deadweight losses D
C 
(r) of the two 
borrowers in a group is
1
1 2
2 2
2 1
1
2 ( ) .
r r
CD r d d
β θ β θ
θ θ
θ θ
β β θ θ
θ θ θ θ
− −
+
=
− −
∫ ∫
Performing the integrations and simplifying terms yield (17).
Proof	that	 ( )CD r′ >	0	(Proposition	6)
Differentiating (17) gives
2
4 ( )
( ) 0
( )C
r r
D r
β β θ
θ θ
−
= >′
−
for /r θ β> .
Proof	that	D
C 
(r)	≤	D
I 
(r)	when r ≤	 /(2 )θ β and	 ./7 2749θ θ< 	(Propo-
sition	6)
Let ∆(r) º D
I 
(r) – D
C 
(r). We have to show that ∆ (r) ≥ 0 for / 2r θ β≤ ( ). 
Substituting for D
I 
(r) and D
C 
(r) from (12) and (17), respectively, gives
3 3 2 2 2
2
8 3 ( 3 ) (3 )
( ) .
6 ( )
r r
r
β β θ θ θ θ θ
β θ θ
− + + − +∆ =
−
The polynomial on the right-hand side has a local minimum at r = 0, a 
root at /r = θ β and a local maximum at ( 3 /r = ) (4 )θ + θ β . So
3 2
3
2
9 4 3 1
0
2 24 ( )
     
− + − +            ∆ = ≥ 
− 
θ θ θ
θ θ θθ θβ β θ θ
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is sufficient for ∆ (r) ≥  0 for r in the interval [ / , /θ β θ β(2 )]. The third-
order polynomial in /θ θ  in the numerator on the right-hand side has 
roots –0.2749, 2 and 7.2749. So the conditions / 2 >θ θ  and /7.2749 <θ θ  
ensure ∆ (r) ≥ 0.
Proof	of	Proposition	6	when	 /7.2749 <θ θ 	does	not	hold
Denote the largest root of ∆(r) = 0 as rˆ. The proof of Proposition 6 in the 
main text goes through without modification whenever ˆ Cr r≥ , for this 
inequality ensures ( )Cr∆ > 0, so that the last inequality in the chain
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )> ≥ ≥I I I I C C CD r D r D r D r
remains valid. So we can focus on the case
ˆ .Cr r< 
We will show that this contradicts
max
IR ρ.≥
This proves that it is not profitable to enter the market with an IL 
contract.
Rewrite D(r) as
3 2 2[ 8 (3 (3
( )
6
r r r
r
θ β β θ θ βθ θ θβ
β θ θ 2
 
− − + + ) + + )]  
∆ = ( − )
.
The largest root of D(r) = 0 is equal to the larger root of the quadratic 
term in brackets:
2 23 9 102 33
ˆ
16
r
+ + + +
=
θ θ θ θθ θ
β .
From maxIR ≥ ρ, RC (rC) = r, ˆ < Cr r , and ( ) 0CR r′ > for r < rC, we have
ˆ( ).maxI CR R r>
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Using (15), the inequality ( )maxI CR R r> can be written as
2 223 3 2 28 16 4 ( 2 ) ( ) 0.r r rβ β θ β θ θθ θ θ θ θ− + + − − − − <
Substituting ˆr r=  and simplifying terms yield
3 2
2 2
59 131 551 215
23 46 25 9 102 33 0.
θ θ θ
θ θ θ
θ θ θ θ
θ θ θ θ
   
− − + + +      
    
− − + + <         
The left-hand side of this inequality is positive for /3.0100 >θ θ , 
which is implied by the case distinction /7.2749 >θ θ . So ˆ( ),maxI CR R r≤  
a contradiction. It follows that (GL, r
C
) is an equilibrium if /3.0100 .>θ θ  
This completes the proof of Proposition 6, since the validity of the asser-
tion for /7.2749 <θ θ  has already been shown.
Proof	of	Proposition	6	when	condition	(16)	does	not	hold
Similarly as in the case of Proposition 4, we have to show that with GL 
and ( )/(2 )> +r θ θ β , the expected repayment falls short of maxCR and the 
deadweight loss is an increasing function of the interest rate.
For r > ( )/(2 )+θ θ β , cases (3), (4) and (6) drop out, and the repay-
ment function becomes
2 3 2 2
2
2 4 2
( ) .
( )C
r r r
R r
− +
=
−
 β βθ θ
θ θ
Using (15), we have
,
2 4 2C C
R R
   + + +
= =      
 θ θ θ θ θ θ
β β β
so the expected repayment function with GL is continuous. Differentiating 
( )CR r  gives
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2 2 2
2
6 8 2
( ) .
( )
− +
=′
−

C
r r
R r
β βθ θ
θ θ
The roots of the quadratic equation on the right-hand side are 
/(3 )θ β  and /θ β . ( )CR r  takes on its local maximum and minimum, 
respectively, at these interest rates. It follows that ( )CR r  is downward-
sloping between ( )/(2 )+θ θ β  and /θ β . Taken together, it follows that 
( ) maxC CR r R<  for ( )/(2 ) / .+ < <rθ θ β θ β
The deadweight loss is
3 3 2 2 3 2 2 3
2
8 12 3 3 3
( )
6 ( )
− + − − − +
=
−

C
r r
D r
β β θ θ θ θ θθ θ
β θ θ
for ( )/(2 )> +r θ θ β . The deadweight loss is a continuous function of the 
interest rate:
3 2 3
2
3 2
.
2 26 ( )C C
D D
θ θ θ θθ θ θ θ
β ββ θ θ
   + − + +
= =   
−   
It increases as the interest rate rises:
2
4 ( )
( ) 0
( )
−
= >′
−

C
r r
D r
β θ β
θ θ
for all / .<r θ β
Proof	that	R
S 
(r)	is	hump-shaped	over	the	interval [ / , / ]θ β θ β
From (19), ( / ) ( / ) 0.S SR θ β θ β= Π =  Differentiating RS(r) = ΠS (r)r gives
2 2
2
3 4 ( 2 )
( )
( )S
r r
R r
− + + −
′ =
−
β βθ θ θ θ
θ θ
,
so ( / ) 1 0.= >′SR θ β  Since RS (r) is a third-order polynomial with nega-
tive leading coefficient and ( / ) /=SR θ β θ β , it follows that there is a 
unique maximum in the interval [ / , / ].θ β θ β
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Derivation	of	D
S 
(r)
The formula for the deadweight loss in the model with social sanctions 
is obtained from
1
1 2
1
( ) .=
− −
∫ ∫r rSD r d dβ βθ θ
θ
β θ θ
θ θ θ θ
Proof	that	 ( ) 0′ >SD r 	for	 /r θ β> 	(Proposition	7)
Differentiating D
S 
(r) gives
3 2 2 2
2
3 2
( ) .
2 ( )S
r r
D r
− −
′ =
−
β β θ βθ
β θ θ
The derivative is positive if
2
2 2 1 0.
3 3
r r
 
− − >  
θ θ
β β
The roots of the quadratic term on the left-hand side are /(3 )−θ β and 
/θ β , so the inequality is satisfied for all / .>r θ β
Proof	that	D
S 
(r)	≤	D
I 
(r)	for	 / /rθ β θ β≤ ≤ 	(Proposition	7)
Inserting the definitions of D
S 
(r) and D
I 
(r) into D
S 
(r) ≤ D
I 
(r) and rear-
ranging terms yield the equivalent condition
( )( )( ) 0.r r r− − − + ≤θ β β θ θ β
Proof	that	 ( ) 0maxS SU r ≥ 	(Proposition	7)
From (19), R
S 
(r) º Π
S 
(r)r, (20), and E(θ) – D
S 
(r) = U
S 
(r) + R
S 
(r),
3 3 2 2 2 2 3
2
3 ( 2 4 )
( ) .
2 ( )S
r r r
U r
+ − + − + + −
= +
−
θ θ β β θ β θ θθ θ θ
β β θ θ
So
2S
U
  + +
= −  
θ θ θ θ θ
β β β
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and
,SU
θ θ θ θ
β β β
  +
= −  
so that 0 ( / ) ( / )S SU Uθ β θ β< < . The derivative
3 2 2 2 2
2
3 6 ( 2 4 )
( )
2 ( )S
r r
U r
− + − + +
′ =
−
β β θ β θ θθ θ
β θ θ
of U
S 
(r) vanishes at
1 2
2
( )
3 ,r
± −
=
θ θ θ
β
where 1 2/ /r rθ β θ β< < < . Thus, US (r) has a local maximum at some 
/r θ β< , is positive at /r θ β=  and /r θ β= , and takes on a local mini-
mum between these two interest rates. We have to show that U
S 
(r) < 0 
cannot happen for maxSr r≤ .
There is a unique r  in the interval ( / , / )θ β θ β  such that 
( ) ( / )S SU r U θ β= . Define
( ) ( )S Sf r U r U
θ
β
 
≡ −    .
This function can be rewritten as
3 2 2 2 2
2
[ ( 3 ) ( )]
( ) .
2 ( )
r r r
f r
 
− + − + − + +  
=
−
θ β β θ θ β θ θθ θβ
β θ θ
f (r) = 0 for /r θ β=  and for
1/2
3 5( )
.
2
r
θ θ θ θ
β
− + ± −
=
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The smaller value r
1
 is negative, so the larger value r
2
 is the unique r 
in the interval ( / , / )θ β θ β  such that f(r) = 0, that is, ( ) ( / )S SU r U θ β= . 
That is, 2r r= . To show that US (r) > 0 for 
max
Sr r< , it suffices to show 
that maxSr r> .
max
Sr  is the larger solution to ( ) 0SR r′ = :
2 22 3 6 4
3
max
Sr
θ θ θθ θ
β
+ − +
= .
Comparing r  and maxSr  shows that 
max
Sr r>  for / 1,θ θ >  which is 
implied by (1). It follows that
( ) ( ) 0.maxS S S SU r U r U
 
> = >  
θ
β  
Appendix 2.	Optimal	Contracts
As mentioned in the main text, given symmetric information, the first-
best solution can be achieved by means of the threat of sufficiently 
severe penalties, for example, with r = r and r(q) = 2r. First-best can 
also be achieved under less restrictive assumptions: We can give up the 
assumptions that (a) borrowers have a second source of income that ena-
bles them to always repay irrespective of project returns and that 
(b) repayment is an all-or-nothing decision, and we can (c) replace sym-
metric information with the possibility of using cross reports.
(a) Given that q is observable by borrowers and lenders alike, one can 
specify a state-contingent repayment function r(q) and a penalty function 
p(q) such that MFIs break even and r(q) ≤ q for all q. That is, the unlim-
ited liability assumption (i.e., the assumption that repayment may exceed 
project pay-off) is dispensable. As an example, let
1
2( ) max{ ,0}, [2 ( )]r pθ θ θ θ θ θ θ= − ≡ − −′ ′ ,
and p(q) = 2r(q). MFIs break even: E[r(q)] = r. Since r(q) ≤ p(q), repay-
ing r(q) is incentive-compatible. Since r(q) ≤ q, the repayment scheme is 
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consistent with limited liability. (b) The assumption that repayment is an 
all-or-nothing decision is also inessential to the achievement of the first-
best solution. To see this, let borrowers choose a repayment b (0 ≤ b ≤ q), 
let r(q) be defined as above and let the penalty be given by
( , ) max{2[ ( ) ], 0}.p b r bθ θ= −
Repaying b = r(q) is incentive-compatible: for all q, we have r(q) ≤ b 
+ p(q, b) for all b. (c) The first-best solution can still be achieved even if 
MFIs cannot observe project outcomes if MFIs can make use of cross 
reporting and borrowers cannot make enforceable side contracts (cf. Rai 
and Sjöström 2004, Proposition A1, 230; Rai and Sjöström 2010: 13). 
For the sake of simplicity, we return to the assumption that borrowers 
can always repay. The interest rate is r = r. There are groups of two bor-
rowers (i = 1, 2); i’s strategy is (b
i
, m
i
), where b
i
 is her repayment and m
i
 
is a message interpreted as what she says j (≠ i) should repay. The pen-
alty on each borrower is 0 if b
1
 = m
2
 and b
2
 = m
1
 and 2r otherwise. Due 
to the absence of side contracts, borrowers play the repayment-message 
game non-cooperatively. For any realisation (q
1
, q
2
), if both i play (b
i
, m
i
) 
= (r, r), a Nash equilibrium prevails. The pay-offs are q
i
 – r, whereas 
any deviating strategy yields q
i
 – 2r.
The interesting case from the mechanism design point of view is 
asymmetric information and limited (but enforceable) side contracting 
(cf. Rai and Sjöström 2004; Bhole and Ogden 2010). When (a) liability 
is limited to project pay-offs, (b) repayment is not an all-or-nothing deci-
sion and (c) MFIs cannot observe project outcomes, it follows from 
Diamond (1984, Proposition 1, 397) that the second-best IL contract 
specifies the (non-pecuniary) penalty function as p(b) = max{r – b, 0}, 
where r is the solution to
[1 ( )]
r
d F r r+ − =
−
∫θ θ θ ρθ θ
and b is the repayment chosen by the borrower (use is made of the 
assumption that q is uniformly distributed). With no restrictions on side 
contracts (ex-ante side contracting), this second-best outcome can also 
be realised with joint liability (cf. Rai and Sjöström 2004, Proposition 1, 
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223): Let r be defined as above, and let i’s strategy be her repayment b
i
. 
There is joint liability in that the penalty p
i 
(b
1
, b
2
) = max{r – (b
1
 + b
2
)/2, 
0} for i depends both on her own and peer group member’s repayment. 
The (enforceable) side contract stipulates that project pay-offs are pooled 
and shared equally by the two members of a group and that both repay 
min{r, (q
1
 + q
2
)/2}. This leads to the same pay-offs as in the above sec-
ond-best situation. When side contracting is restricted to take place after 
the project pay-offs are realised (‘interim side contracting’), achieving 
the second-best pay-offs necessitates cross reporting (Rai and Sjöström 
2004, Proposition 5, 229).
Bhole and Ogden (2010, Propositions 4 and 5, 353–54) analyse the 
second-best GL contract assuming that exclusion from future credit is 
the only feasible penalty. They show that with no side contracts GL is the 
equilibrium type of finance, as it yields higher borrower utility than IL. 
Interestingly, the repayment by a borrower whose peer group member 
defaults is only slightly higher than the contractual repayment on her 
own loan. This result runs counter to BC’s assumption that borrowers are 
held liable for the full group loan when their peer group member decides 
not to contribute to the repayment of 2r.
Notes
 1. Cooperation is an explicit part of Putnam’s (1993) definition of social capital 
as ‘features of social organization, such as networks, norms, and trust, that 
facilitate coordination and cooperation for mutual benefit’.
 2. Thus, cooperative behaviour and social sanctions are means of making 
joint liability lending work. Rai and Sjöström (2004, 2010) argue that joint 
liability in GL is dispensable if borrowers have the opportunity to cross-
report in group meetings.
 3. Several studies show that very close ties between group members may 
undermine repayment incentives, probably via collusion against the lender 
(which is not part of the BC model). For instance, repayment rates fall when 
the proportion of relatives in a group rises (Sharma and Zeller 1997) or when 
members of a group are also members of the same church (van Bastelaer 
and Leathers 2006). Hermes and Lensink (2007) provide a survey of recent 
evidence.
 4. However, in Bratton’s (1986) description of Zimbabwean credit pro-
grammes GL reached superior results, even though with IL loans to ‘farmers 
are reached through the medium of farmer group committees’, which hold 
‘loan application meetings’ (Bratton 1986: 118).
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 5. This condition captures the idea that borrowers prefer the penalty over 
repayment in the case of minimum project return even at zero interest (i.e., 
r = 1): / 1 rθ β < =  (cf. BC, p. 8). Given this inequality, our former assump-
tion /2θ θ>  is implied by BC’s (p. 8) somewhat stronger condition /2 .θ β>
 6. Introducing tangible collateral to the model would probably increase the 
relative attractiveness of GL compared with IL: the incentive to default on 
a group loan when one would have repaid a single loan (the drawback of 
GL) would shrink, while the incentive to stand in for a peer borrower with 
a failed project (the advantage of GL) would not be undermined. One might 
also think of collateral as a pecuniary part of the penalty. See footnote 7 on 
this.
 7. In the working paper version of this article, we denote the fraction of the 
penalty that is pecuniary as a (0 £ a £ 1). We comment on the interesting 
differences a > 0 make compared to the simple case considered here in foot-
notes 15, 17, and 20.
 8. This makes an assumption as to who repays and who free-rides (Assumption 4) 
necessary. Bhole and Ogden (2010) show how ‘reminders’ can be used to turn 
‘both contribute’ into the unique subgame-perfect equilibrium instead.
 9. The Maple code used to solve the example is available for download at the 
corresponding author’s website.
10. Since the number of borrowers who repay is equal to the number of borrow-
ers who free-ride, the probability is necessarily 50 per cent on average. Any 
mechanism that randomly assigns these roles to borrowers implies a prob-
ability of 50 per cent for everyone.
11. The fact that every borrower gets credit means that there is no conflict 
between financial self-sufficiency and outreach.
12. Here and in what follows, it is straightforward to establish uniqueness of the 
equilibria described in the propositions.
13. The validity of these equations can be checked from (7), (10) and (12) for IL 
and from (8), (11) and (13) for GL.
14. The cumulated expected penalty on both borrowers, conditional on the 
occurrence of case (5), is 2 /(2 )r θ β+ , that is, it is greater than the cumu-
lated contractual payment 2r.
15. If a positive fraction of the penalty is pecuniary (i.e., a > 0), the expected 
repayments are higher for each interest rate. When the penalty is 100 per 
cent pecuniary (i.e., a = 1), the expected repayment is higher with GL than 
with IL for all admissible interest rates. However, even so, IL is possibly 
used in equilibrium for ‘large’ values of a: In the working paper version of 
this article, we construct an example with a = 0.99 and IL in equilibrium.
16. Stiglitz and Weiss (1981) point out that these kinds of market failure can 
arise when the expected repayment function is hump-shaped. Actually, the 
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stipulated hump shape cannot occur in their own model of the credit market 
(see Arnold and Riley 2009; Coco 1997).
17. Evidently, the same conclusions with regard to market failures remain valid 
if one allows for pecuniary penalties (i.e., a > 0).
18. The assumption that no sanctions are imposed otherwise is immaterial. 
Adding sanctions in other instances as well strengthens our conclusions. As 
to the severity of the sanctions, we could alternatively assume /s θ β>  (so 
that s is ‘large enough’ in terms of model parameters).
19. Contributing to the repayment of the group loan is a weakly dominant strat-
egy here. So if we use elimination of weakly dominated strategies rather than 
the Pareto criterion to sort out equilibria, the results would be even more 
favourable to GL. Another way to rule out the Pareto-inferior equilibrium 
would be to assume, contrary to Assumption 6, that i imposes a sanction on 
j only if j’s decision not to contribute harms i.
20. The fact that non-negativity of borrowers’ expected utility is non-trivial 
becomes apparent once one allows for a > 0. For a sufficiently close to 
unity, there exist values for the cost of capital r such that only GL breaks 
even, but borrowers’ expected utility is negative at the break-even interest 
rate r
S
.
21. Crowding out is more pronounced among women, who are the main recipi-
ents of microcredit.
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